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 Executive compensation in the U.S. is under intense scrutiny by legislators, 
regulators, and investor advocates.  Excessive or poorly structured compensation 
arrangements have been blamed for the U.S. financial crisis of 2008 as well as the 
malfeasance in recent years at Enron, WorldCom, and other major U.S. corporations.1  
A key complaint is that executive compensation is insufficiently focused on the long-
term, leading to reckless, short-term decision making by executives, and, at the 
extreme, financial bubbles that inevitably burst with negative consequences extending 
far beyond the employees and shareholders of the companies directly involved.2 
 
 After years of rhetoric, but little action, it appears that the federal government 
may be poised to take meaningful steps to increase executive compensation 
regulation.  Moreover, combating short-termism appears to be high on the agenda.  
The recent federal bailout legislation specifies that incentive compensation granted to 
senior executives must be in the form of restricted stock that may not vest until the 
government loans are repaid,3 and influential congressmen advocate broader 
application of rules tying executive pay to long-term performance.4  Academic 
commentators seem to agree.  Even some commentators who do not favor capping the 
amount of executive compensation favor restrictions on the form and term of 
executive pay.5  Professors Roberto Romano and Sanjai Bhagat have recently 
recommended that all executive incentive pay take the form of restricted stock or 
restricted stock options that cannot be sold/exercised during employment or for two to 
four years following termination.6  To be sure, Bhagat and Romano only propose 
mandating such a rule for firms receiving bailout funds.  Otherwise they would leave 
the decision to individual boards of directors.7  On the other hand, Judge Posner has 
recently advocated that firms be required to deliver a minimum percentage of CEO 
pay in the form of restricted stock that could not be sold for some specified number of 
years.8 
                                                 
 
1 See, e.g., Judith F. Samuelson & Lynn A. Stout, Are Executives Paid Too Much?, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 25, 2009 (attributing the financial crisis to short-term thinking, driven in part by compensation 
plan design). 
2 See Samuelson & Stout, supra note 1.  
3 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H.R. 1, 111th Cong. §1 [hereinafter 
ARRA].   
4 See, e.g., Susanne Craig, Cuomo, Frank Seek to Link Executive Pay, Performance, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 13, 2009 (relating comments of House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney 
Frank). 
5 See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and 
Committing to the Long-term (Working Paper, Feb. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1336978; Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if so, What if Anything Should be 
Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013 (2009). 
6 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5.    
7 However, Bhagat and Roman note that an argument could be made for extending a 
mandatory regime to all FDIC insured institutions.  See id. at 7.  See also, Samuelson & Stout, supra 
note 1 (advocating that executives be required to hold “a significant portion of their equity for a period 
beyond their tenure,” but not suggesting that such a rule be mandated). 
8 See Posner, supra note 5, at 1045-46.   
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 Of course, company directors can be encouraged to link executive pay more 
closely to long-term performance, but given the current push for more coercive 
measures, this essay considers the possible role of federal regulation in deterring 
reckless behavior, earnings manipulation, and other pathologies associated with short-
termism.  I am not concerned specifically with compensation at bailed out firms, or 
even at financial firms generally, but with broadly applicable executive pay regulation 
that could or should follow from the current crisis.9  This essay makes the following 
points. 
 
 First, attempting to regulate the form and term of executive compensation is as 
challenging as attempting to regulate the amount.  Any regulatory response would 
have to consider the substantial complexity and diversity of current executive pay 
arrangements, uncertainty as to the underlying reasons (and hence appropriate 
remedies) for short-termism, and the potential conflict between deterring reckless 
short-term behavior and encouraging sufficient risk-taking to maximize share value 
over the long term.  As an example of the latter challenge, consider a rule that would 
force executives to hold a creditor risk in their companies until retirement.  Such a 
rule might be an excellent way of deterring earnings manipulation and bet-the-
company risks but might cause executives to act too conservatively, undermining 
long-term value maximization.  
  
 Second, close examination of existing programs and proposals for combating 
short-termism reveals several serious concerns that suggest that these approaches may 
not be suitable as models for executive pay regulation generally.  For example,   
  
 Approaches that would restrict incentive pay to one or two equity-based 
instruments would eliminate valuable diversity in executive pay arrangements, 
barring not only short-term incentives, but also non-equity arrangements that 
tie executive wealth to firm performance over the long term.   
 
 Approaches that would require executives to hold equity until retirement 
would impose significant burdens on executives in terms of reduced liquidity 
and under-diversification.  These burdens would increase the wedge between 
the cost of equity incentives to shareholders and their value to executives. 
 
 In order to avoid circumvention, approaches that would restrict the term of 
incentive pay must be tightly circumscribed, e.g., by capping the amount of 
non-incentive pay or specifying a percentage of pay that must be in the form 
of long-term incentives.  As a result, existing proposals either impose 
                                                 
 
9 As Jeff Gordon argues, “[c]ompensation design in financial firms can have systemic effects” 
that call for a distinct and specific regulatory approach.  See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: 
Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, ___ HARV. J. LEG. ___ 
(2009) (proposing compensation structures that force employees of financial firms to internalize the 
risks they create).  




inefficient one-size-fits-all solutions on diverse firms, industries, and 
executives or are easily circumvented.   
 
 Finally, this essay considers how federal regulation directed at short-termism 
might be shaped to increase the chances that the benefits would outweigh the harms.  
After all, some additional regulation may be inevitable, and less coercive regulation 
might even be desirable.   Two ideas are offered.  First, this essay argues that policy 
makers should consider focusing regulation solely on the term of pay while leaving 
the choice of instrument to individual companies in order to preserve as much 
efficient diversity in pay arrangements as possible.  Term-only regulation is not 
unambiguously preferable to existing proposals because of the risk that it would result 
in excessive conservatism, but it would get at the root of the current short-termism 
concern and is an option that should be on the table if regulation is to be pursued.  
Second, depending on the ultimate source of the short-termism phenomenon, 
disclosure-based regulation focused on the average holding period of executive pay 
could help mitigate the worst examples of short-termism while avoiding many of the 
costs and unintended consequences of compulsory regulation. 
 
 The bottom line is that regulating the term of executive pay is no less challenging 
than regulating the amount and may not be worth undertaking.  Legislators, 
regulators, and other observers may be frustrated by this situation, but the pitfalls 
should be recognized.   
 
 
II. WHAT IS SHORT-TERMISM, AND WHY DOES IT EXIST? 
 
 
 Perhaps the leading corporate governance concern of legislators and 
commentators at the present is the reckless pursuit of short-term profits by corporate 
executives who will have cashed out before the long-term repercussions are felt.  The 
pathology sometimes appears in the form of earnings manipulation, which often 
involves sacrificing long-term share value to boost near-term earnings.10  Enron 
Corporation, where earnings manipulation was practiced as an art and eventually 
evolved into fraud and led to bankruptcy, is the poster child for this branch of short-
termism.11  However, short-termism often takes the form of completely legal, but 
excessively risky behavior, such as banks adopting lax lending standards or financial 
firms taking on too much exposure to derivatives.  Judith Samuelson and Lynn Stout 
have argued that the overarching cause of the 2008 financial crisis was “business 
                                                 
 
10 See, e.g., John R. Graham et al, Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions, FIN. 
ANALYSTS J., Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 27, 31 (reporting results of a survey of over 400 CFOs indicating that 
over half of respondents were willing to sacrifice shareholder value in order to achieve earnings 
targets). 
11 See Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 9-11 
(2003) (describing Enron’s abusive use of mark-to-market accounting and special purpose entities to 
manipulate earnings). 
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leaders taking on excessive risk in the quest to increase next quarter’s profits.”12  To 
be clear, the concern is not just that executives fail to establish sufficient risk controls, 
but that executives affirmatively seek out high risk, high short-term return 
strategies.13 
 
 Why does short-termism allegedly run rampant in corporate board rooms?  Most 
commentators point to short-term accounting-based bonuses that incent managers to 
maximize current year profits at the expense of long-term share value14 and short 
vesting stock options that cause managers to prefer strategies that increase stock price 
volatility, even if those strategies do not maximize expected returns. But 
compensation arrangements can only be a proximate cause.  They cannot be an 
ultimate cause of short-termism.  Why are compensation arrangements too short-term 
focused?  As we will see in this Part, that is a very complex question, and its 
elusiveness is one reason that combating short-termism is so difficult.   
 
A. Market Myopia 
 
 One possible answer is that existing executive compensation arrangements reflect 
myopic investor preferences.15  Shareholders, in other words, do not want managers 
to focus any more on the long term than they already do.  Indeed, Samuelson and 
Stout argue that “institutional and individual investors alike [have become] 
preoccupied with quarterly earnings forecasts and short-term price changes.”16   
 
 However, in order for the stock market as a whole to exhibit myopia, that is, to 
account for myopia existing in an environment populated with sophisticated 
arbitrageurs, one must posit a market imperfection, such as information asymmetry, 
which leads to systematic discounting of long-term opportunities.17  It is certainly 
plausible that investors would have relatively greater difficulty evaluating managerial 
                                                 
 
12 See Samuelson & Stout, supra note 1.  
13 Although earnings manipulation and reckless risk taking may be viewed as two 
manifestations of a common phenomenon, their remedies may be quite different.  For example, 
clawback provisions in executive compensation agreements that allow firms to recoup bonuses that are 
paid based on inaccurate financial results that are later restated may be an effective means of 
combating earnings manipulation but would not mitigate excessive risk taking.  See, e.g., ARRA, 
supra note 3, at § 111(b)(3)(B) (requiring TARP participants to have provisions in place for the 
recovery “of any bonus, retention award, or incentive compensation paid to [specified executives and 
employees] based on statements of earnings, revenues, gains, or other criteria that are later found to be 
materially inaccurate”).  
14 See Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in CORPORATE 
RESTRUCTURING & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 3, 10-11(John M. Stern et al eds., 1989). 
15 On market and managerial myopia, see generally Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and 
Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61 (1988) [hereinafter Stein, Takeover Threats]; Jeremy C. 
Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. 
ECON. 655 (1989) [hereinafter Stein, Efficient Capital Markets]; Brian Cadman & Jayanthi Sunder, 
Investor Myopia and CEO Horizon Incentives (Working Paper, June 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 956601. 
16 Samuelson & Stout, supra note 1. 
17 See Stein, Takeover Threats, supra note 15.  




claims regarding the costs and benefits of long-term projects,18 but empirical evidence 
concerning market myopia is mixed.19  Of course, if the market is myopic, we would 
expect executive compensation arrangements to reflect this myopia and to focus 
excessively on current earnings generation.   
 
B. Managerial Myopia 
 
 Even if markets are not inherently myopic, managers might be.  First, managers 
might believe that the market is myopic and shape their own behavior accordingly.20  
Second, consistent with a model developed by Professor Stein, managers might 
rationally behave myopically as a result of a sort of prisoner’s dilemma, even if they 
know that the market is efficient in equilibrium.21  Third, in some cases, managers 
might have a shorter investment horizon than shareholders because they expect to 
retire or leave the company in the near term and hence are not motivated to pursue 
long-term goals.22 
 
 In these situations, managerial and investor preferences are not aligned, and one 
must invoke agency costs to explain why managers would be allowed to act on their 
myopic preferences.  Suppose the market is not inherently myopic, but managers are.  
In order to overcome managerial myopia, managerial wealth should be tied to firm 
performance over the longer-term, which, in the view of finance theorists, helps 
explain vesting requirements on stock and options and long-term incentive plans with 
multi-year horizons.23  But managers resist having too much of their wealth tied to 
long-term performance because of the negative effects on the diversification of their 
portfolios and liquidity.  The optimal pay arrangement would balance the 
shareholders’ desire for long-term incentives against managerial risk aversion and 
liquidity concerns.  As a result, even the optimal pay arrangement would be more 
short-term focused than shareholders would prefer.24   
                                                 
 
18 See Samuelson & Stout, supra note 1 (“It is extremely difficult for an outside investor to 
gauge whether a company is making sound, long-term investments by training employees, improving 
customer service, or developing promising new products.”)   
19 The empirical evidence on both market and managerial myopia is inconclusive.  It has been 
suggested that the growth in private equity buyouts, which free firms to focus on long-term gains, is 
some evidence of market myopia.  See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PENN. L.REV. 1021, 1086 (2007).  Others point to positive 
stock market reaction to long-term investment as evidence against market myopia.  However, Stein 
notes that such behavior is consistent with managerial myopia since shareholders will highly value new 
investment approved by reluctant managers.  See Stein, Takeover Threats, supra note 15, at 77. 
20 See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor 
Voice, 39 U.C.L.A. L.REV. 811, 865 (1992). 
21 See Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 15 (positing model in which current 
earnings signal future earnings, firms inflate current earnings to signal future prospects, investors 
discount current earnings accordingly, but no firm can credibly defect). 
22 See  Black, supra note 20. 
23 See Cadman & Sunder, supra note 15, at 1 (citing sources). 
24 Cf. Keith J. Crocker & Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Earnings Manipulation and 
Managerial Compensation, 38 RAND J. ECON. 698, 707 (2007) (demonstrating that in a hidden action 
model the optimal managerial contract would permit some earnings manipulation). 
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 In addition, managers have every incentive to reduce their risk exposure, below 
that ostensibly agreed to, by negotiating hard on seemingly insignificant details of 
their compensation, such as vesting schedules, ex ante, and through hedging, 
backdating option grants, and similar schemes ex post.25  If one is a fervent believer 
that boards faithfully and capably represent shareholder interests and that executive 
pay arrangements reflect optimal contracting, there would be less of a reason to worry 
about inadequate term from the shareholders’ perspective.  However, if one believes 
that managers exert significant control over their own pay packages, one would 




 Next, even if the capital markets accurately and efficiently gauge short- and long-
term opportunities and risks, pay arrangements might be too short-term focused from 
a social perspective.  Not all of the costs that result from myopic firm behavior are 
borne by parties to the contracts, at least not in the cases in which short-termism has 
been taken to an extreme.  At Enron, at WorldCom, and certainly at the banks at the 
center of the subprime mortgage-sparked financial crisis, a significant portion of the 
cost has been borne by employees who own few shares, by suppliers, by the 
communities at large, and in some cases by taxpayers.  If the shareholders and the 
managers retain between them a larger fraction of the gains from short-term, risky 
behavior when such behavior pays off than they do of the costs when things go 
wrong, we should expect firms to take on more risk and for pay packages to be more 
short-term focused than would be optimal for society as a whole.27 
  
D. Regulatory Push 
 
 Finally, past regulation of executive pay may have encouraged compensation 
design that promotes short-termism.  First, although accountants were generally of the 
view in the early 1990s that stock option expense should be recognized as an expense 
for financial accounting purposes, the Financial Accounting Standards Board failed to 
                                                 
 
25 At the extreme, hedging transactions can completely eliminate firm-specific risk.  See 
David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundations of Incentive 
Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440 (2000).  As a result of backdating, executives effectively 
replaced risky at-the-money options with less risky in-the-money options.  See David I. Walker, 
Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on the Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. 
L.REV. 561 (2007). 
26 Under a managerial power view of the executive compensation setting process, pay is 
capped in part by investor outrage, and managers seek out low salience means of boosting their pay.  
One way to subtly increase the value of a pay packages is to decrease its risk, and shortening the term 
of equity and non-equity incentives is one way to decrease risk.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., 
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
751 (2002) (proposing a managerial power theory of the executive pay setting process); LUCIAN 
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004) (same). 
27 This, of course, is the standard problem associated with negative externalities.  See Ronald 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.& ECON. 1 (1960).   




mandate option expensing until 2004.28  Prior to this, options were uniquely free 
goods from an accounting perspective.29  The compensation alternatives – restricted 
stock, accounting-based incentives, and, of course, salary – all resulted in an expense 
under GAAP.  Second, in promulgating IRC § 162(m) in 1993, Congress encouraged 
firms to redirect executive salaries into performance-based pay, and the regulations 
made it particularly easy to qualify conventional stock options as fully deductible 
executive compensation.30  Both of these decisions made stock options particularly 
attractive as a compensation device and may have contributed to overuse.31 
 
 The accounting treatment of options has now been rationalized, and aggregate use 
of options by U.S. companies is much reduced versus the late 1990s/early 2000s.32  
That change may have already reduced short-termism pressure to some extent, but 








 Part IV will consider several specific approaches to regulating the link between 
executive pay and long-term firm performance based on the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) legislation and suggestions of commentators.  We will see that each 
has serious shortcomings as a model for general coercive regulation.  Before turning 
to specific approaches, however, this Part explores several generic challenges to 
regulatory intervention aimed at combating short-termism that might be 
underappreciated by regulators or commentators. 
 
A. Uncertain Source and Extent = Uncertain Remedy 
                                                 
 
28 See FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 123: 
SHARE-BASED PAYMENT (REVISED 2004) [hereinafter SFAS 123R] (requiring “fair value” accounting 
for all equity compensation including options); FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 123: ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION (Oct. 1995) 
(requiring firms to present pro forma income statements including option expense, but not mandating 
fair value accounting for options). 
29 See David I. Walker, Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior, 64 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 927, 953-57 (2007) (discussing the accounting treatment of options and implications). 
30 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (deeming conventional non-discounted options and 
SARs to qualify as performance-based pay if certain minimal procedural requirements are satisfied). 
31 See Walker, supra note 29, at 953-57 (discussing anecdotal and empirical evidence that the 
anomalous accounting treatment of options was a primary factor in their growing use in the 1990s). 
32 See David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal 
Contracting (Working Paper, Aug. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443170 (documenting 
that stock option compensation (including SARs) constituted over 60% of the aggregate ex ante 
compensation of S&P 500 senior executives in 2000, and showing that by 2007 the fraction had 
declined to 25%). 
33 See id. (documenting that 17% of S&P 500 senior executives received options as their only 
equity incentives in 2007). 




 As we have just seen, there are several factors that may have contributed to short-
term behavior.  Moreover, while theory suggests that short-termism could be 
systemic, there is much uncertainty regarding the pervasiveness and significance of 
the problem.  Discussion of short-termism tends to focus on the failings of specific 
firms such as Enron, WorldCom, and AIG, but thousands of public companies in the 
U.S. exhibit no signs of pathological short-term behavior.  Moreover, I am aware of 
no empirical evidence establishing that executive pay term is inadequately focused on 
long-term performance from either a shareholder or a societal perspective, 
systemically.34   
 
  This uncertainty increases the difficulty of shaping a regulatory remedy.  For 
example, if short-termism is primarily the result of market myopia or externalities, a 
coercive response might be indicated.  Presumably, company directors would need to 
be prodded to take steps contrary to the priorities of their executives and their 
shareholders.  However, if managerial agency problems and compensation opacity are 
key contributors, improved disclosure could be a reasonable first step towards 
combating short-termism.35  Similarly, if short-termism is systemic, this suggests 
more coercive regulation; if limited to a subset of firms, less coercive regulation may 
be in order. 
 
 The federal government has never attempted strongly coercive regulation of 
executive pay.  Previous regulation generally has taken the form of tax incentives and 
                                                 
 
34 There is empirical evidence linking earnings management with strong equity incentives.  
See, e.g., Bin Ke, Do Equity-Based Incentives Induce CEOs to Manage Earnings to Report Strings of 
Consecutive Earnings Increases? (Working Paper, July, 2005) (finding that firms whose CEOs have 
high equity-based incentives are more likely to manage earnings); Pengjie Gao et al, Earnings 
Management and Executive Compensation: A Case of Overdose of Option and Underdose of Salary? 
(Working Paper, July 2002) (finding a positive relationship between earnings management intensity 
and option and bonus amounts and incentive intensity).  On the other hand, evidence of a link between 
executive compensation design and accounting fraud is mixed.  See Crocker & Slemrod, supra note 24, 
at 699 (reviewing the literature).  
To my knowledge, no one has studied the relationship between equity or incentive 
compensation vesting periods and governance, although that relationship would seem to be central to 
this issue.  Perhaps variation in vesting periods is inadequate to produce statistically significant results, 
but although modest, there is some variation in equity compensation vesting periods from firm to firm.  
Options vest in three years at roughly half of large U.S. companies, in four years at about 30% of 
firms, and in five years at about 15% of companies.  See FREDERICK W. COOK & CO., THE 2008 TOP 
250: LONG-TERM INCENTIVE GRANT PRACTICES FOR EXECUTIVES 17 (2008).   
35 U.S. public companies routinely claim that their executive compensation programs are 
designed to ensure a focus on long-term shareholder value. See, e.g., Eli Lilly, Proxy Statement (Form 
DEF 14A), at 23 (Mar. 10, 2008) (stating that “compensation should foster a long-term focus”). 
Indeed, proxy materials often specifically assert an emphasis on long-term incentives over short-term 
incentives. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 27 (Mar. 12, 2008) 
(claiming that its CEO pay mix consists of 70% long-term incentives, but excluding from the 
calculation about $3 million of perks and other benefits received by the CEO during the fiscal year).  
As we will see, however, given the complexity and diversity of modern executive compensation 
programs, claims such as these are difficult to assess objectively utilizing existing proxy disclosures.     




disclosure requirements.36  As we will see, strongly coercive regulation carries 
significant risks and costs, which may be difficult to justify without more certainty 
regarding the source and extent of the problem. 
  
B. Mitigating Short-Termism and Avoiding Excessive Managerial Conservatism 
May Be in Tension 
  
 Interestingly, while corporate finance researchers have long been concerned with 
executive appetites for risk, their focus has generally been on the problem of 
excessive conservatism on the part of risk averse executives.  Because executives’ 
human capital and often a disproportionate amount of their financial capital is tied up 
in their firms, executives are inherently more risk averse than diversified 
shareholders.37 As a result, executives would tend to be more conservative than 
shareholders would prefer in selecting projects, making acquisition decisions, etc., 
and fail to maximize the long-term value of the enterprise.38  Of course, this 
conservatism problem is much more subtle than the recklessness problem that is the 
center of attention today.  Nothing blows up if executives are too conservative.  
 
 Paying executives with restricted stock tends to increase risk aversion and 
conservatism.39  On the other hand, the lack of personal downside risk and the 
tremendous upside potential provided by stock options can increase executive 
appetites for taking on risk at the firm level.40  This is the traditional corporate finance 
explanation for the inclusion of options in executive compensation packages.     
 
 The tension between mitigating recklessness and avoiding excessive conservatism 
is obvious.  The two are just the opposite ends of a continuum.  While options can 
induce executives to take share value enhancing risks, they can lead to excessive risk-
taking and earnings manipulation in imperfect capital markets that fail to completely 
and instantly incorporate these activities into share prices.41  Forcing executives to 
                                                 
 
36 See infra Part III.E. 
37 See, e.g., John E. Core et al, Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: a Survey, 
FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 7 (summarizing research); Richard A DeFusco et al, The 
Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders, 45 J. Fin. 617, 618 (1990). 
38 See Core et al, supra note 37, at 7; DeFusco et al, supra note 37, at 618. 
39 See Core et al., supra note 37, at 7.   
40 See id. (noting that it is optimal to add options to a manager’s compensation package when 
the manager’s project selection choices affect firm risk). 
Options do not necessarily cause managers to seek risk.  Options have an incentive effect, as 
described in the text, but they can also produce a risk aversion effect.  An option that is far in the 
money, for example, resembles restricted stock and may discourage risk taking.  Moreover, whether 
the incentive effect or risk aversion effect dominates depends on the risk aversion “profile” of the 
manager.  See, e.g., id.; Thomas Hemmer et al, Introducing Convexity into Optimal Compensation 
Contracts, 28 J. ACCT. & ECON. 307 (2000); Jennifer Carpenter, Does Option Compensation Increase 
Managerial Risk Appetite?, 55 J. FIN. 2311 (2000).     
41 Cf. Crocker & Slemrod, supra note 24 (showing that when managers can conceal actions 
and information from shareholders, a compensation contract based on reported earnings cannot provide 
managers with the incentive to maximize profits and report them honestly). 
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hold restricted stock until retirement would mitigate earnings manipulation and bet-
the-company risk taking, but, as noted, stockholdings actually increase executive risk 
aversion and conservatism.  Avoiding recklessness and excessive conservatism 
requires a very fine balancing act that would seem to be very difficult to achieve with 
one-size-fits-all regulation.42 
 
C. Existing Executive Compensation Arrangements Are Complex and Diverse   
 
 Executive pay arrangements are more complex and diverse than is generally 
recognized.  Some of the complexity and diversity may be unnecessary, but there is 
evidence that the diversity increases the efficiency of executive pay arrangements.  
As this section explains, that diversity makes one-size-fits-all approaches to 
combating short-termism problematic. 
 
 It is quite common, today, for a senior executive of an S&P 500 company to 
receive base salary; one or more annual bonus opportunities; various equity-based 
and cash-based long-term incentive pay grants, such as restricted stock, stock options, 
performance shares, stock appreciation rights (SARs), long-term incentive plan 
(LTIP) units, etc.;43 as well as supplemental retirement contributions, and various 
other perks and benefits.  As a result of this complexity, the discussion and analysis 
section of proxy statements detailing this compensation now routinely runs twenty to 
thirty pages.44   
 
 Not only are executive pay practices complex; they are increasingly diverse.  
Comparing the pay of executives at different firms had become so difficult that in 
2006 the SEC began requiring companies to disclose a bottom line total compensation 
figure for each senior executive whose pay is detailed in the firm’s proxy statement.45   
 
                                                 
 
42 Although the conservatism problem is not inherently a long-term or short-term 
phenomenon, there are long-term and short-term aspects.  Excessively risk averse executives would 
tend to prefer shorter term, more incremental projects, such as cost cutting, which are relatively safe, to 
longer-term R&D intensive projects, which are relatively risky.  Thus, conservatism could be viewed 
as a second and conflicting “short-termism” problem.  However, in order to avoid confusion, I will 
refer to the latter problem as conservatism and reserve the short-termism label for recklessness. 
43 Restricted stock is stock that is granted to an employee provisionally.  The stock is forfeited 
if it fails to vest because employment is terminated before the vesting date, or, in some cases, because 
performance requirements for vesting are not satisfied.  Stock options provide the right but no 
obligation to purchase company shares at a predetermined exercise price between a vesting date and an 
expiration date.  Performance shares are similar economically to restricted stock, but employees 
receive performance shares after vesting conditions are met, rather than before.  SARs are contractual 
rights that are economically equivalent to options.  LTIPs are typically accounting-based incentive 
plans with payoffs determined by firm performance over a several year period.  For more detail on 
these instruments and their use by the largest U.S. public companies, see COOK, supra note 34. 
44 See, e.g., Eli Lilly, Proxy Statement, supra note 35 (21 pages); Johnson & Johnson, Proxy 
Statement, supra note 35 (32 pages). 
45 See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, SEC Release Nos. 33-8732A; 
34-54302A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53158 (Sept. 8, 2006); see also Executive Compensation and Related Person 
Disclosure, SEC Release Nos. 33-8655; 34-53185 (Jan. 27, 2006) (discussing motivation). 




 Executive incentive pay arrangements, in particular, have become much more 
varied over the last decade.  Ten years ago, conventional stock options dominated the 
landscape at U.S. public companies,46 but their prevalence was in part the result of 
favorable accounting treatment that was eliminated in 2004.47  Today the regulatory 
playing field for stock, options, and non-equity incentives is much more level,48 and 
the use of these instruments is more balanced and diverse.  In 2007, for example, 
stock options and SARs accounted for only about 33% of the total long-term 
incentive compensation of the senior executives of S&P 500 companies.49  Restricted 
stock and performance units accounted for about 44%, and non-equity, accounting-
based plans accounted for the remaining 23%.50  These figures exclude annual 
incentives, which are also generally based on accounting performance.51  They also 
gloss over significant variations within the categories.  Conventional time-vested 
restricted stock and stock options probably accounted for only about 50% of total 
long-term incentive compensation for senior S&P 500 executives for 2007.52   
 
 The current diversity in compensation instruments may be greater than is optimal 
from a shareholder or social perspective,53 but empirical evidence suggests that 
diversity increases the efficiency of compensation.  For example, there is evidence 
that the mix of stock and options granted to executives varies predictably with firm 
characteristics such as size and growth opportunities.54   
 
                                                 
 
46 At the peak of the dot-com boom, stock options accounted for over 60% of the total 
compensation of senior S&P 500 executives as measured on an ex ante basis.  Execucomp data. 
47 See SFAS 123R, supra note 28. 
48 See David I. Walker & Victor Fleischer, Book/Tax Conformity and Equity Compensation, 
__ Tax L.Rev. __ (2009) (discussing the tax, accounting, and disclosure treatment of various equity 
compensation instruments). 
49 Execucomp data. 
50 Execucomp data. 
51 Annual incentives accounted for about 6% of total 2007 compensation for senior S&P 500 
executives.  Execucomp data. 
52 Author’s estimate based on Execucomp data and a sample of hand collected proxy 
statements allowing for subdivision of options into conventional options and SARs and stock into 
conventional restricted stock, performance-vested restricted stock, and performance shares. 
53 It is an interesting question, although largely beyond the scope of this essay, why these 
arrangements have become so complex and diverse.  The optimistic story would be that diversity in 
company and executive circumstances has led to this diversity in optimal pay arrangements.  I have 
presented a more pessimistic view elsewhere, namely that the complexity and diversity serve to 
obfuscate pay and reduce investor backlash. See David I. Walker, The Manager’s Share, 47 WM. & 
MARY L.REV. 587 (2005).  See also Bebchuk et al., supra note 26 (proposing a managerial power 
theory of the executive pay setting process in which obfuscation reduces investor outrage that restrains 
pay); BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 26 (same).  However, while the pessimistic view suggests that 
shareholders might benefit from simplified executive pay packages, it does not imply that the menu of 
compensation choices should be limited legislatively.   
54 See, e.g., John Core & Wayne Guay, The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity 
Incentive Levels, 28 J. ACCT. & ECON. 151 (1999); Wayne R. Guay, The Sensitivity of CEO Wealth to 
Equity Risk: An Analysis of the Magnitude and Determinants, 53 J. FIN. ECON., 43 (1999).  Of course, 
we cannot know the incremental value of the diversity in executive compensation composition.  The 
value could be relatively small, but the economic stakes are large. 
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 Regulatory approaches that would restrict the form of compensation in a quest to 
combat short-termism threaten to reduce this diversity and potentially the efficiency 
of pay arrangements.55  The idea of restricting incentive pay to a particular instrument 
or instruments is even more problematic when combined with the idea of requiring 
executives to hold the instrument for an extended period.  We have little experience 
with very long-term executive incentive pay arrangements and really no idea which 
instruments would best link pay and performance over longer periods.  Less than 5% 
of firms utilize stock or options that vest more than five years out,56 and, 
interestingly, while a few firms utilize incentives that remain in place until retirement, 
some of those plans are based on accounting results rather than stock prices.57  
 
D. Short-Termism is a Function of More than Annual Compensation  
 
 Annual executive pay packages seems to be a natural starting point for attempting 
to combat short-termism, and many proposals adopt this perspective, but it is clear 
that executive incentives are much more complex.  First, the incentives associated 
with an executive’s most recent pay package make up only a small part of the 
executive’s total compensation-related incentives.  In order to properly analyze (or 
influence) executive incentives, one must look at the “stock” of incentives 
accumulated over time in the form of shares, unexercised options, and other long-
term arrangements, not just the annual “flow” of incentives.58  Second, the economic 
incentives of founders and some other executives may be dominated by equity 
holdings that were not accumulated through compensation at all.  Third, 
compensation is not the sole source of incentives.  For example, the prospect of 
advancement or the threat of dismissal creates incentives that are related to 
compensation but vary considerably depending on an executive’s age and career 
arc.59   
                                                 
 
55 Jeff Gordon argues that shareholder “say on pay” mandates could result in much less 
diversity in executive pay arrangements as a result of the likely role played by proxy advisory firms 
and their incentives.  See Gordon, supra note 9.  He raises similar concerns regarding the potential loss 
of efficiency from more one-size-fits-all pay arrangements.  See id.  In Gordon’s view, efficient 
executive pay arrangements should be expected to be diverse because executive pay serves several 
different functions, the importance of which vary from firm to firm and from time to time for particular 
firms.  See id. 
56 See Cook, supra note 34, at 17 (reporting that options vest beyond 5 years at only 2% of 
surveyed firms and that stock grants vest beyond 5 years at only 4% of firms). 
57 See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson, Proxy Statement, supra note 35, at 29-30 (describing 
Certificate of Extra Completion Plan under which executives receive units that are valued based on the 
company’s net asset value and earnings power per share and which are payable on retirement). 
58 See Core et al, supra note 37, at 4-5 (arguing that it is more appropriate to look at the stock 
than the annual flow in evaluating the level of incentives). 
59 See, e.g., Atreya Chakraborty et al, Termination Risk and Managerial Risk Taking, 13 J. 
CORP. FIN., 170 (2007) (arguing that managerial investment decisions “depend not only on how a 
manager’s compensation changes with firm risk but also on how his/her job is affected if the project 
fails”); Greg Hallman et al, Carrots and Sticks: Incentive Compensation and the Likelihood of 
Termination, (Working Paper, Oct. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1122548 (arguing that 
termination provides a powerful incentive for executives apart from their compensation and may 
partially offset the need to provide incentives through other channels). 




 All of these incentives, and others, would affect the propensity of managers to 
engage in short-term reckless behavior.  It is obviously very difficult for firms to 
manage these complex webs of incentives and even more difficult for a regulator to 
do so. Regulation focused solely on current year compensation is even less likely to 
hit the mark. 
 
E. Previous Attempts to Regulate Executive Pay Have Resulted in 
Circumvention and Unintended Consequences  
 
 Previous attempts to regulate executive pay at the federal level have consisted 
largely of tax incentives and SEC mandated pay disclosure.  These initiatives have 
achieved mixed success, at best, and often have resulted in circumvention or 
unintended consequences.  These experiences provide lessons for those wishing to 
regulate the form or term of executive pay. 
 
1. Tax Incentives 
 
 Congress has twice in the last twenty-five years turned to the tax code in an 
attempt to influence executive pay practices.  We have already encountered IRC 
§ 162(m), which was enacted by Congress in 1993 and limits a corporation’s tax 
deduction for non-performance-based pay granted to certain senior executives to $1 
million per year.  There is some uncertainty as to the goals Congress had in mind in 
enacting this provision, but if it was meant to slow the increase in total executive pay, 
it was almost certainly unsuccessful.60  If the provision was meant only to re-direct 
pay from straight salary to more performance sensitive channels, it was successful, 
but may have inadvertently sparked the executive stock option boom of the 1990s.61   
 
 There is both good news and bad news here for proponents of regulation 
improving the link between executive pay and long-term performance.  On the 
positive side, the § 162(m) experience suggests that it may be easier to influence the 
design of compensation than the amount.  On the negative side, the experience 
highlights how difficult it is to balance executive incentives.  Section 162(m) may 
have been too successful in increasing the performance sensitivity of executive pay.   
 
                                                 
 
60 See Robert F. Gox, Tax Incentives for Inefficient Executive Pay and Reward for Luck 
(Working Paper, 2008) (reporting that the “average total pay of S&P 500 CEOs rose from $2.6 million 
in 1993 to $14 million in 2000” and remained at $9.4 million in 2002 even after the burst of the dot-
com bubble); see also Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 
64 WASH. & LEE L.REV. 877, 917-20 (2007) (describing empirical evidence indicating that § 162(m) 
was associated with an increase in executive pay). 
61 See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation, in TAX 
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (2000) (finding that salary reductions post-1993 were more than offset by 
additional stock option grants); see also Polsky, supra note 60, at 906 (documenting the widespread 
belief among informed observers that § 162(m) contributed to the options explosion, but also noting 
the lack of clear cut empirical evidence). 
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 No more effective, apparently, was Congress’s 1984 attempt to rein in excessive 
“golden parachute” executive severance packages by restricting corporate tax 
deductions for parachute payments and imposing excise taxes on recipients of excess 
payments.62  Although the rule initially led to some firms capping parachute 
payments at the maximum amount deductible, over time companies began to exceed 
the cap, forfeit the deduction on the excess, and “gross up” executives for the excise 
tax, effectively shifting the entire cost of non-compliance to the shareholders.63   
 
 One lesson to be learned from this experience is that the effectiveness of tax rules 
(or other non-compulsory regulation) aimed at executive pay may be limited because 
of the significant agency problems in the pay process.   Given this track record, one 
can readily understand why a more coercive regulatory attack on short-termism might 
be appealing, but, of course, the potential inefficiencies and costs of compulsory 
regulation are greater.   
 
2. SEC Executive Pay Disclosure Requirements 
 
 The SEC’s proxy disclosure rules might be viewed as another attempt to regulate 
executive pay.  Over the last seventeen years, the SEC has steadily increased the 
coverage, depth, and specificity of required disclosures.64  Currently, firms are 
required to provide detailed discussion and analysis of executive pay as well as 
numerous tables, the content of which is specified in exacting detail, including a 
summary compensation table that includes a bottom line total compensation figure for 
each of five senior executives.65   
 
 These disclosure requirements were not directly aimed at limiting executive pay, 
but it is safe to say that many commentators hoped that shedding light on pay 
practices would result in greater restraint.  However, there is no empirical evidence to 
date that the proxy disclosure rules have reduced or slowed the increase in executive 
                                                 
 
62 See IRC §§ 280G & 4999 (denying deduction and imposing excise tax on severance 
payments in excess of an executive’s average compensation over the previous five years). 
63 See Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions: Time for Repeal?, 21 VA. TAX REV. 
125, 136, 139 (2001).  Because a gross up payment is subject to income tax and additional excise taxes 
and is not deductible for the corporation, the decision to gross up an executive can result in a cost to 
shareholders that is an order of magnitude greater than the benefit to the executive.  See David I. 
Walker, Tax Incentives Will Not Close Stock Option Accounting Gap, TAX NOTES, Aug. 5, 2002.  
Nonetheless, a 1996 study reported that over half of CEO contracts included golden parachute gross up 
provision.  See Carol Bowie & Judy Fischer, Have Parachutes Become More Than Security Blankets?, 
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 17, 19. 
64 See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, supra note 45 (reviewing 
history of executive pay disclosure regulation and noting that regulations issued in 1992 replaced 
narrative discussion with tabular disclosure).  The 1992 regulations actually marked a return to tabular 
presentation that was first mandated in the 1930s and that was replaced by narrative disclosure in the 
1980s.  See id. 
65 SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402. 




pay and good reason to suspect the reverse.66  One of the suspected responses to 
systematic executive pay disclosure was a kind of Lake Wobegon effect.67  The idea 
was that company boards generally believed that their executives were above average, 
or believed that admitting that their executives were below average would undermine 
investor confidence.68  In any event, fuller disclosure of pay appeared to lead more 
often to pay increases than decreases, as low pay firms sought to bring pay levels up 
at least to the average of the relevant peer group.69   
 
 Another likely response to enhanced scrutiny under the 1992 disclosure 
regulations was a shift in compensation from quite visible channels of pay, such as 
salary, stock, and options, to less visible channels, such as pensions.70  However, the 
1992 disclosure regime was not comprehensive.  It practically invited creative 
circumvention.  Such subterfuge is rendered less effective by the SEC’s 2006 
mandate that firms disclose a bottom line figure including all channels of pay, but it is 
probably too early to determine whether the revised rules have had any salutary effect 
on the overall amount of executive compensation.   
 
 There are at least two lessons to be learned from the SEC’s experience with 
mandatory executive pay disclosure.  First, to the extent that disclosure regimes are 
not comprehensive, we should expect executives to creatively mitigate the impact of 
these rules by various circumventions, such as shifting pay channels.  Second, we 
should be aware that even disclosure regimes can produce unintended consequences, 




IV. PITFALLS OF EXISTING PROGRAMS AND PROPOSALS FOR COMBATING SHORT-
TERMISM 
                                                 
 
66 In a study of the effects of benchmarking CEO pay, Professors Bizjak, Lemmon, and 
Naveen find that “CEOs with pay below the median of their peers receive substantially larger raises” 
than CEOs paid above the median.  The authors conclude that their results are consistent with an 
efficient system for determining the reservation wage, but they note that “benchmarking… could have 
led to greater increases in pay than would have occurred in its absence.  See Bizjak et al, Does the Use 
of Peer Groups Contribute to Higher Pay and Less Efficient Compensation?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 152, 166 
(2008).  Professors Bebchuk and Grinstein document a growth in executive pay between 1993 and 
2003 in excess of that which can be explained by changes in firm performance.  See Lucian Bebchuk 
& Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 283 (2005). 
67 Lake Wobegon, of course, is radio personality Garrison Keillor’s mythical Minnesota 
community where “all the children are above average.”  See http://prairiehome.publicradio.org/.  
68 See Charles Elson, What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation?, 81 HARV. BUS. REV. 68, 
72 (2003) (relating comments of DuPont CEO Edward Woolard, Jr.). 
69 See Bizjak et al, supra note 66, at 154 (reporting that 73 of 100 randomly selected 
companies “mention targeting at least one component of pay at or above the peer group median or 
mean”); see also, Rachel M. Hayes & Scott Schaefer, CEO Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect 
(Working Paper, Dec. 2008,) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 966332 (developing a game-
theoretic model of the Lake Wobegon effect and demonstrating that the effect can lead to an upward 
distortion in equilibrium CEO pay under certain conditions). 
70 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra, note 26. 
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 The generic challenges inherent in attempting to craft a regulatory response to 
short-termism are exemplified by several specific programs and proposals that have 
been offered by legislators, administrators, and commentators.  Moreover, 
examination of these specific approaches highlights additional concerns that arise in 
attempting to craft a regulatory response.  Consider the following plans, proposals, or 
suggestions. 
  
 In early February, the Obama administration announced that all incentive 
compensation received by top executives at firms receiving “extraordinary 
assistance” from the government would have to be in the form of restricted 
stock that could not vest before the government loans are fully repaid.71  
Congress modified the Treasury plan in the economic stimulus bill that it 
passed in mid-February, broadening the reach to include at least one executive 
of each participant in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), but 
retaining the requirement that executive bonuses be paid in restricted stock 
that may not vest until the loans are repaid.72  However, unlike the Treasury 
plan that would have capped non-incentive pay at $500,000 per year, ARRA 
caps restricted stock incentive pay at one-third of total annual compensation.73 
 
 Professors Roberto Romano and Sanjai Bhagat have recently recommended 
that all executive incentive pay take the form of restricted stock or restricted 
stock options that cannot be sold/exercised during employment or for two to 
four years following termination.  They would have the Treasury mandate 
such a rule for firms receiving bailout funds, and they suggest that an 
argument can be made to extend the rule to include managers of all FDIC 
insured financial institutions, but otherwise they would leave the decision to 
individual boards of directors.74   
 
 Jesse Brill, a practitioner and frequent commentator on executive pay has 
proposed that executives be barred from cashing in stock until they reach age 
65 or are two years past retirement.75   
 
 Aspen Institute’s Judith Samuelson and Professor Lynn Stout have suggested 
that executives be required to hold “a significant portion of their equity 
beyond their tenure.”  It is not clear, however, whether they would favor 
                                                 
 
71 See Press Release, Treasury Dept., Treasury Announces New Restrictions on Executive 
Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009).   
72 See ARRA, supra note 3.  The final act contains some vague language that will be open to 
interpretation by the Treasury Department when it writes implementing regulations.  See Deborah 
Solomon & Mark Maremont, Bankers Face Strict New Pay Cap, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2009.  
73 See Press Release, supra note 71; ARRA, supra note 3. 
74 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5.  
75 See Mark Maremont & Joann S. Lublin, Loopholes Sap Potency of Pay Limits, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 6, 2009 (quoting Brill).   




regulation to this effect or simply wish to encourage boards to place this 
restriction on executive pay.76 
 
 Judge Richard Posner has recently advocated that firms be required to deliver 
a minimum percentage of CEO pay in the form of restricted stock that could 
not be sold for some specified number of years.77   
 
 Most of these approaches envision compulsory regulation, and, unless the 
underlying causes of short-termism are identified and corrected, some sort of coercive 
regulation presumably would be needed to cause boards to alter their pay practices to 
deter reckless behavior and earnings manipulation.  As we have seen, the short-
termism problem, to the extent that it is a real problem, reflects shareholder 
preferences, resulting from market myopia or externalities, is the result of managerial 
agency problems, or follows from a current regulatory bias in favor of options.  This 
Part, in any event, will consider these programs and proposals as models for generally 
applicable, coercive regulation of executive pay, and explore the costs and risks that 
follow.     
  
A. Diversification, Liquidity, and Valuation Problems Arising from Minimum 
Holding Periods  
 
 Each of these approaches places a minimum term on some or all incentive pay – 
presumably a term that exceeds current vesting practices.  Longer holding periods for 
incentive pay raise liquidity, diversification, and valuation concerns for participants.  
Unless one is prepared to go so far as to place a hard cap on the total compensation 
received by executives, which would be an extreme view, one must recognize that the 
associated costs would largely be borne by shareholders.78  There is, in short, a 
tradeoff between the term of executive pay and the amount of pay. 
 
 Bhagat and Romano anticipate some of these concerns.  They recognize that 
forcing executives to hold stock and options until retirement would leave them under-
diversified and facing a lack of liquidity.79  Their response to the diversification 
concern is to suggest that the amount of equity pay would be increased to offset the 
greater risk.80  The shareholders would compensate the executives, in other words, for 
limiting their diversification.  But there are two potential problems with this solution.  
First, in cases in which compensation term was efficiently set by the market initially, 
this combination – more pay and riskier pay – would represent an inefficient 
                                                 
 
76 See Samuelson & Stout, supra note 1.  
77 See Posner, supra note 5. 
78 Under an optimal contracting view of the pay setting process, executive compensation 
would be held constant on a risk and liquidity adjusted basis, and shareholders would bear virtually all 
of the cost of restrictions placed on vesting.  Under a managerial power view, executives might absorb 
a fraction of these costs since increased nominal pay, even in compensation for these burdens, could 
trigger investor outrage.  See Bebchuk et al, supra note 26; BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 26. 
79 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5. 
80 See id. 
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deviation for shareholders from the optimal contract.  Second, whether the initial 
contract was optimally set or not, the increase in the amount of equity pay could 
expose firms and executives to increased outrage over the size of executive pay 
packages.  As a result, it might be difficult for firms to make their executives whole 
on a risk adjusted basis.81 
 
 To alleviate the liquidity concern, Bhagat and Romano suggest that firms increase 
salaries and that Congress increase the deductibility of executive salaries for 
corporate tax purposes to facilitate their doing so.82  This fix suffers from the same 
defects as increasing equity pay to compensate for restricting diversification, but, in 
addition, using salary to compensate for reduced incentive pay liquidity may actually 
undermine the link between pay and long-term performance.83 
 
 Of course, even if they are compensated, executives would be tempted to hedge 
stock and option grants they are required to hold until retirement as a self-help means 
of improving liquidity and diversification.84  Dean Schizer has shown that tax and 
securities laws make it difficult and costly for executives to hedge their exposure to 
options, but that executives can readily hedge restricted stock in the period between 
grant and vesting.85  If the motivation is strong enough, however, executives will 
hedge option grants as well.  Thus, steps would need to be taken to ensure that 
compulsory holding periods are not undermined by increased hedging. 
 
 Lengthening equity compensation holding periods would also amplify valuation 
problems.  As several commentators have suggested, restricted stock issued by the 
problem banks accepting bailout funds, which is junior to the claims of the 
government and bondholders and that would pay off for the executives only if 
conditions improve significantly, resembles an option.86  If so, executives who are 
forced to accept such stock and hold it until government loans are repaid or until 
termination will reasonably value the stock like an option, i.e., as worth considerably 
less than the market price of the stock.  Bhagat and Romano suggest that executives 
be given more stock to offset the value differential,87 but under current pay disclosure 
rules, the market price of this stock, not the lower option value, would be reported as 
                                                 
 
81 Shareholder outrage is a consideration if one believes that executive pay practices are not 
entirely the result of arm’s length contracting between the board and the executives.  See Bebchuk et 
al, supra note 26; BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 26.  Executives might be able to deflect investor 
outrage over larger pay packages by pointing out that the changes were imposed upon them by 
government regulators.  Cf. Polsky, supra note 60, at 906 (arguing that, under a managerial power 
model, IRC § 162(m) would have provided managers with an excuse to rewrite compensation contracts 
in their favor). 
82 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5. 
83 At the extreme, firms that entirely replaced incentive pay with straight salary would create 
no direct link between pay and long-term performance.   
84 Compensation would not reduce the incentive to hedge.   
85 See Schizer, supra note 25. 
86 See Victor Fleischer, Conglomerate blog posting (Feb. 4, 2009); Lucian Bebchuk, Congress 
Gets Punitive on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2009.   
87 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5. 




the measure of executive compensation.   As a result, executives in this situation 
would receive more of something they value less, and the gap between the value of 
pay perceived by the executives and by the public would grow even larger.   
 
 To be sure, this valuation problem would be most acute at troubled banks 
participating in the federal bailout programs, which are not the primary concern of 
this essay, but the valuation gap is not unique to troubled banks or to restricted stock.  
Bhagat and Romano have also proposed that executive stock options not be 
exercisable until two to four years following retirement.88  For the average CEO, they 
suggest, this would mean waiting for seven to nine years to exercise options.89  
Today, options typically become exercisable three to five years following grant and 
are exercised soon thereafter if in the money.  Given the liquidity and diversification 
constraints discussed above, imposing longer holding periods would significantly 
reduce the value of options to executives.  Perversely, however, the calculated value 
of an option that is assumed to be exercised in eight years would be greater than that 
of an option that is expected to be exercised in five to six years.90  At the very least, 
we would need to rethink our approach to compensatory option valuation and 
disclosure if longer holding periods were imposed. 
 
 Of course, if executive pay is too short-term focused today, systemically, some of 
the diversification, liquidity, and valuation costs described above are worth incurring.  
To the extent that agency problems result in sub-optimally short-term compensation, 
shareholders might benefit from regulation that increased the term of pay, even if they 
are forced to pay for it.  Moreover, to the extent that excessively short-term focused 
pay results in negative externalities, shareholders should bear the costs of regulation 
that mitigates those externalities.  The problem, as discussed in the next section, is 
that mandatory, one-size-fits-all vesting periods would be arbitrary and extremely 
blunt instruments.   
 
                                                 
 
88 See id. 
89 See id.  The authors do not consider the average holding period faced by junior executives 
under their proposal, but it would certainly be longer than their estimate of the average CEO holding 
period. 
90 Executive options are valued for disclosure purposes using an option pricing model.  
Generally, the expiration date of an option is one of the inputs to these models, and the value of an 
option increases with its term.  However, in order to adjust for predictable early exercise, the expected 
holding period of compensatory options (often five to six years) substitutes in these models for the 
contractual time to expiration when calculating value for disclosure and accounting purposes.  
Presumably, however, if an option cannot be exercised before retirement and the expected time to 
retirement is eight years, that period would be used for valuation purposes resulting in greater 
disclosed value.  Certainly, there would be no basis for choosing a shorter, counterfactual period.  The 
root of the problem is that the current option valuation approach utilizes a rough adjustment to the 
models for the unique facts of compensatory options, but the adequacy of this approach depends on an 
assumption that the current, relatively short vesting periods for options do not significantly impact 
exercise behavior.  This assumption would not be valid for executives barred from exercising options 
for seven to nine years.  See SFAS 123R, supra note 28 (describing option valuation methodology that 
is used for SEC disclosure as well as financial accounting purposes). 
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B. The Problem of One-Size-Fits-All Regulation  
 
 Part II suggested that the link between executive pay and long-term performance 
may be inadequate, systemically, but, even if we accept this premise, no economic 
theory or empirical analysis can tell us how inadequate the link is for a particular 
firm, industry, or even for U.S. firms on average.  Despite this fact, each of the 
approaches we have seen involves a one-size-fits-all holding period for equity 
compensation.  Bhagat and Romano, for example, suggest a holding period of 
retirement plus two to four years, which would represent at least a doubling of the 
average vesting period of CEO equity compensation and an even greater increase in 
the average vesting period of equity granted to subordinate executives. 
 
 Perhaps a dramatic shift in executive pay term along these lines is required to 
overcome agency problems and force companies to internalize all of the costs of 
short-termism.  However, any arbitrary holding period or periods for incentive pay 
raises the possibility that the term will be excessive and inefficient for some, perhaps 
many, firms and their executives.   
 
 From the shareholders’ perspective, the optimal term of executive pay would 
balance the costs related to diversification, liquidity, and valuation against the 
benefits of tying executive wealth to long-term performance.91  The optimal term 
would vary considerably by industry, firm, and executive.  Consider, for example, 
requiring executives to hold equity incentives until retirement.  While the benefit of 
doing so at similarly situated firms might be fairly constant, the cost would be much 
greater for a 40 year old CEO than for a 60 year old CEO.  Moreover, while the cost 
of this rule might be similar for two 50 year old CEOs, the benefit for a regulated 
utility with low growth opportunities, little scope for earnings manipulation, etc., 
might be much less than it would be for AIG.  The bottom line is that one-size-fits-all 
targets for executive pay term that have real bite will inevitably exceed the optimal 
mark for some firms and executives. 
 
C. Limiting Compensation Diversity 
 
 We now turn our attention from regulation of the term of incentive pay to 
regulation of its form.  Each of the approaches discussed would to some extent limit 
incentive pay to a specific instrument or instruments.  This is troubling for several 
reasons.  First, as this section describes, instrument-specific regulation limits the 
diversity of devices that firms can use in linking pay to long-term performance and 
potentially reduces the efficiency of compensation arrangements. 
 
 Consider, for example, Bhagat and Romano’s proposal to limit incentive pay to 
restricted stock and restricted stock options.  Obviously, details would need to be 
spelled out, but if the idea behind the proposal is to limit incentives to conventional 
                                                 
 
91 See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 3, 6 (2002) (“tradeoff between risk and incentives lies at the heart of agency theory”). 




time-vested restricted stock and options, about half of current long-term incentive pay 
(as well as 100% of annual incentives) would be off the table.92   
 
 Of course, the acceptable circle of incentive pay could be drawn more widely to 
include similar long-term incentive arrangements such as SARs (phantom stock 
options), performance-vested restricted stock, and performance shares (essentially 
phantom performance-vested restricted stock).93  Performance vesting is generally 
based on accounting results,94 which might raise concerns regarding manipulation, 
but, as discussed below, manipulation is less of a concern with respect to long-term 
incentives than annual bonuses.95  Moreover, companies have legitimate reasons for 
avoiding or delaying issuing actual shares through their executive incentive programs.  
For example, some phantom equity plans may reflect investor concerns regarding 
excessive shareholder dilution from traditional stock and option plans.   
 
 However, even if “stock” and “options” are defined broadly to include 
performance-vested instruments and non-equity economic equivalents, a compulsory 
approach along these lines would bar firms from utilizing pure accounting-based 
incentive plans.  As noted, long-term accounting-based plans currently account for 
almost a quarter of long-term senior executive incentives, while annual accounting-
based bonuses account for about 6% of total senior executive pay.96   
 
 Of course, accounting-based incentives have been the target of a great deal of 
academic criticism.97  Annual accounting-based bonuses tend to increase managerial 
myopia and are subject to manipulation.  Well documented, for example, is the “big 
bath” phenomenon, which entails managers taking operational steps to defer income 
and accelerate expenses as it becomes clear that annual targets will not be achieved, 
thus improving the prospects for big bonuses the following year.98   
 
 However, the opportunities for manipulation and the payoffs decline as the 
measurement period increases.  Accounting-based LTIPs that measure performance 
over three or more years should present much less of a manipulation problem than 
                                                 
 
92 Obviously an approach that would limit firms to restricted stock only would be even more 
restrictive. 
93 The Obama administration’s February 2009 plan hints at this possibility.  See Press 
Release, supra note 71 (limiting senior executive incentives at firms receiving exceptional assistance to 
“restricted stock or other similar long-term incentive arrangements”). 
94 Although performance measures vary widely, profit measures, such as earnings per share, 
net income, or operating income, are frequently employed.  See Cook, supra note 34, at 18. 
95 See infra notes 99 and 100 and accompanying text. 
96 See supra notes 50 and 51 and accompanying text. 
97 See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. CIN. 
L.REV. 713, 739 (1995) (arguing that accounting-based bonuses encourage executives to manipulate 
short-term earnings). 
98 See STEVEN BALSAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 315 (2002) 
(describing the big bath). 
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annual bonuses.99  Indeed, such plans might actually represent a stronger commitment 
to long-term focus than equity grants as they insulate participants from the influence 
of short-term stock price fluctuations.  It is not clear that we should preclude firms 
from utilizing these plans.100 
 
 Moreover, despite their drawbacks, precluding all annual incentives for 
executives would appear to be an overreaction to inadequate focus on long-term 
performance generally, particularly for the executives junior to the CEO.  And 
eliminating long-term accounting based incentives would certainly be problematic for 
this group.  While 100% equity incentive compensation might be appropriate for a 
CEO, who ultimately is accountable for the firm’s share price, it would not be 
appropriate for a junior executive, who is directly responsible for some facet of 
operations and has much less influence over the share price.101 
 
 Finally, as discussed above, limiting incentive pay arrangements to stock and 
options or any other particular instruments is even more troubling when contemplated 
against the backdrop of lengthy new holding period requirements, given our relatively 
paltry experience with incentive arrangements extending beyond five years.102   
 
 To be sure, requiring that incentives take the form of stock and options would not 
necessarily preclude firms from using other performance measures to determine the 
amount of equity compensation to be conferred on an executive or, perhaps, from 
maintaining accounting-based plans that simply pay out, after the requisite holding 
period, using vested stock as currency.103  However, the existing proposals appear to 
contemplate that executives would hold equity and be exposed to the firm’s share 
price for an extended period.  The point is that in many cases another means of 
linking executive wealth to long-term firm performance might be more efficient 
economically. 
 
D. Excessive Conservatism 
 
 Although backlash against stock option compensation is understandable in the 
wake of various corporate scandals involving options, regulation along the lines of 
the bailout legislation or the approach endorsed by Judge Posner that would limit 
                                                 
 
99 See Cook, supra note 34 (detailing the prevalence of long-term accounting-based incentive 
plans).   
100 See Samuelson & Stout, supra note 1 (suggesting that “we need new ways to measure 
long-run corporate performance, rather than simply relying on stock price”). 
101 This concern obviously grows in importance with the size of the executive pool subject to 
the regulation.  For example, the restricted stock limitation under the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act applies to more than 20 executives at some companies.  See ARRA, supra note 3, 
§ 111(b)(3)(D)(ii)(IV). 
102 See supra notes 56 and 57 and accompanying text. 
103 For example, Bhagat and Romano state only that “executive incentive compensation plans 
should consist only of restricted stock and restricted stock options.”  See Bhagat & Romano, supra 
note 5.   




incentive pay to restricted stock might encourage excessively conservative executive 
behavior.  Moreover, when combined with lengthy holding periods, even approaches 
that allowed firms to issue options or stock might do so.  Policy makers should be 
wary of adopting regulation that discourages long-term value creation in a quest to 
mitigate short-termism. 
 
 As we have seen, the appetite for risk created by a compensation basket consisting 
solely of cash, perks, and restricted stock generally would be less than the appetite of 
an ordinary diversified shareholder.104  In order to overcome executive risk aversion 
and more accurately align long-term incentives, options are typically added to the 
mix.105  Of course, executive incentives are not solely the product of current 
compensation.  For example, even with a relatively conservative pay package, some 
executives would be encouraged to take risks in order to gain recognition and 
promotion.  Even CEOs, who are unlikely to be auditioning for better jobs, might take 
some risks in order to increase the prospects of retaining their jobs.  On balance, 
however, pay packages lacking options could lead to undue conservatism on the part 
of senior corporate executives. 
 
 Although Bhagat and Romano are not explicit on this point, it is likely that their 
proposal to limit incentive compensation to restricted stock or options reflects the 
value of options in aligning long-term incentives.  However, while I view this 
approach as an improvement over stock-only proposals, even their proposal might 
result in excessive conservatism.   
  
 As we have seen, imposing lengthy holding periods on incentive pay reduces 
executive liquidity, impairs diversification, and increases the wedge between the cost 
of equity compensation to firms and the value to executives.  The latter two effects 
are more pronounced for options than they are for stock.  The exposure to share price 
created by a $1 million option grant may be several times greater than the exposure 
created by a $1 million stock grant.106  Moreover, the discount to market value 
assessed by non-diversified executives is greater for risky options than stock and 
increases with the required holding period.107  As a result, we should expect that 
                                                 
 
  104 See supra Part III.B. This statement is qualified because in the context of the bailout 
legislation, restricted stock might take on the incentive properties of an option and might promote risk 
taking.  If the banks were liquidated as is, shareholders would get little or nothing, but if the bailout 
plan was a success, shareholders would participate.  See Fleischer, supra note 86; Bebchuk, supra note 
86.  In this particular situation, the government would have better protected taxpayers by forcing the 
executives to take a creditor interest in the banks, rather than an equity interest.  For solidly solvent 
firms, however, executive stock holdings promote conservatism. 
105 See Core et al, supra note 37, at 7. 
106 For example, at grant, options issued by Johnson & Johnson to its senior executives in 
2007 created an exposure to share price four times greater than the exposure created by an equivalent 
value of restricted stock.  Author’s calculation based on data disclosed in proxy statement.  See 
Johnson & Johnson, Proxy Statement, supra note 35, at 44. 
107 See Hall & Murphy, supra note 91, at 36 (demonstrating the effect of increased vesting 
periods on the gap between company cost and the value placed on equity pay by undiversified 
executives). 
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requiring executives to hold equity compensation until retirement would shift their 
preferences in the direction of stock, that negotiated compensation packages would 
include more stock, and that, as a result and all else being equal, executives would act 
more conservatively.  In the current environment, of course, the prospect of 
executives acting more conservatively sounds pretty good.  The concern is that the 
balance could shift too far in the other direction, placing a brake on the long-term 
performance of U.S. companies.  
 
E. Risk of Circumvention  
 
 Most of the proposals we have seen aim to deter short-termism by specifying the 
form and/or term of executive incentive pay, but not the amount or fraction of such 
pay.  To the extent that their plan would be compulsory, Bhagat and Romano, for 
example, would require that any and all incentive pay consist of either restricted stock 
or restricted options that may not vest until some period after retirement, but, 
apparently, they would leave the mix of incentive and non-incentive pay up to 
individual firms.  As this section demonstrates, however, unless a floor is placed on 
incentive pay or a cap on non-incentive pay, mandating lengthy holding periods for 
incentive pay could lead to circumvention that undermines the link between pay and 
long-term performance.  Circumvention could be avoided by placing a restriction on 
the amount or fraction of incentive or non-incentive pay, but doing so would magnify 
one-size-fits-all inefficiencies. 
 
 Let us continue to consider compulsory regulation along the lines proposed by 
Bhagat and Romano.  They suggest that firms should increase salaries to provide 
executives with liquidity to make up for the lengthy holding periods for stock and 
options they propose, and they suggest that the IRC § 162(m) limit on the 
deductibility of non-performance-based pay be increased from $1 million to $3 
million, accordingly.108  But unless non-incentive pay is capped, firms might respond 
to long holding periods placed on incentive pay by reducing or even eliminating 
incentive pay and increasing salaries.  Thus, an approach of this sort could undermine 
the link between pay and long-term performance.   
 
 Some readers might believe that the § 162(m) limit on the deduction for non-
performance-based pay effectively caps non-incentive pay and would limit 
circumvention.  I am not so sure.  Today, despite their ability to qualify compensation 
as performance based and achieve deductibility, many firms grant non-deductible 
compensation to their senior executives.109  As firms routinely state in the proxy 
materials, deductibility is a factor, but not a prerequisite, in designing executive pay 
                                                 
 
108 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5. 
109 See Steven Balsam & Qin J. Yin, Explaining Firm Willingness to Forfeit Tax Deductions 
under Internal Revenue Code § 162(m): The Million Dollar Cap, 24 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 300, 321-
23 (2005) (finding forfeited tax deduction in 40% of firm-year observations).  




packages.110  If vesting limitations along the lines proposed by Bhagat and Romano 
were mandated, I would expect many firms to shift from incentive pay to salary 
despite the lack of deductibility under § 162(m).111  Public companies would not have 
to abandon incentive alignment to do so.  Companies could require executives to 
purchase firm equity on the open market as a condition of employment.112  
 
 I am not, to be sure, advocating a cap on executive salaries.  I am simply pointing 
out that executive pay regulation taking this form is undermined absent such a cap.  
The Treasury’s February 2009 plan would have capped executive salaries at $500,000 
in addition to requiring that incentive pay be in the form of restricted stock.113  Again, 
this plan was limited to bailout firms, but as a model for more general regulation it is 
even more problematic than the Bhagat and Romano proposal.  First, this type of 
approach would not eliminate circumvention unless it also capped perks, benefits, 
retirement contributions, etc.  Second, if it did effectively cap all non-incentive pay, it 
would have gone well beyond the goal of linking pay to long-term performance.  The 
regulation would have specified the instruments and, in the case of salary, capped the 
amount of one of the instruments.  At this point, the plan would have eliminated 
almost all firm discretion and diversity related to executive pay.  Given the diversity 
in executive age, tenure, expenses, and other factors, it should be obvious that a one-
size-fits-all cap on the salary component of pay would be highly inefficient.  (It 
should also be obvious that a sizable amount of restricted stock would be needed to 
compensate executives for the salary cap.) 
 
 Another way to prevent circumvention would be to require that some fraction of 
total executive compensation awarded each year consist of incentive pay of certain 
specified form, as Judge Posner has recently advocated.114  But the arbitrary fraction 
selected would impose another inefficient one-size-fits-all restriction on pay 
                                                 
 
110 See, e.g., Eli Lilly, Proxy Statement, supra note 35, at 32 (stating that its “policy is to 
qualify our incentive compensation programs for full corporate deductibility to the extent feasible and 
consistent with our overall compensation objectives”).   
111 Perversely, a $3 million limit on deductible salary could become more of an expectation 
than a cap, undermining the link between pay and long-term performance even at smaller firms that 
would not have paid salaries this large absent the § 162(m) focal point.  See David G. Harris & Jane R. 
Livingstone, Federal Tax Legislation as an Implicit Contracting Cost Benchmark: The Definition of 
Excessive Executive Compensation, 77 ACCT. REV. 997 (2002) (finding that firms that paid their CEOs 
less than $1 million prior to the enactment of IRC § 162(m) increased cash compensation in proportion 
to the gap between existing compensation and the $1 million deduction limit). 
112 Shares held outside of equity compensation plans may also undermine the link between 
executive wealth and long-term firm performance.  Unless shareholding guidelines are truly binding, 
these shares expose executives to short-term share price risk. 
113 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
114 See Posner, supra note 5.  ARRA limits restricted stock incentive pay to one-third of total 
compensation.  Placing a cap on incentive pay and imposing lengthy holding periods is not likely to 
improve the link between pay and long-term performance.  It will, however, encourage firms to repay 
TARP funds as quickly as possible in order to avoid this and other ARRA restrictions.  See, e.g., Kate 
Kelly, Goldman, Others Getting Aid Are Eager to Pay it All Back, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2009 (nothing 
the Goldman Sachs and other companies are eager to pay back TARP funds “in effort to escape 
toughened scrutiny that complicates operations”).  
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packages, and the annual nature of this restriction is also troubling.  Equity 
compensation grants are often lumpy; they are not made every year.115  Imagine a 
firm that has just hired a new CEO and made a large equity grant to attract the 
executive and align her incentives with shareholders.  The firm may not need to grant 
more equity compensation in the following year.  Its compensation focus might turn 
to salary or annual incentives.  Thus, an arbitrary annual specification of the fraction 
of compensation that must consist of long-term incentives would not only be a much 
poorer fit for some firms than others, it would also be a poorer fit for a particular firm 
in some years than in others.     
 
 
V.  ARE THERE BETTER WAYS TO COMBAT SHORT-TERMISM? 
 
 
 Given the considerable challenges and potential negative consequences inherent 
in any attempt to coercively regulate the form and term of executive compensation, it 
is not clear that the project should be undertaken.  To be sure, minor adjustments 
might be made that could prove beneficial.  For example, firms might be required to 
include effective clawback provisions in executive compensation plans that would 
facilitate the recoupment of bonuses predicated on inaccurate financial results that are 
later restated.116  However, even if the potential benefits of further regulation do not 
outweigh the pitfalls, Congress may feel compelled to regulate more comprehensively 
nonetheless.  Recognizing this possibility, this Part suggests that the regulatory 
approaches analyzed above may not strike the best balance between mitigating short-
termism and avoiding harmful consequences.  This Part offers two ideas that policy 
makers should consider if faced with the job of crafting a regulatory response to 
short-termism: focusing regulation solely on the term of pay and adopting a 
comprehensive disclosure-based response. 
 
A. Regulation of the Term of Pay but Not the Instruments 
 
 If the primary concern is discouraging reckless, short-term behavior, including 
earnings manipulation, fraud, and bet-the-company risk taking, policy makers should 
consider regulating the term of pay but leaving the choice of pay instruments up to 
individual companies.  Forcing an executive to hold stock, options, or unsecured 
creditor interests for a certain period should cause the executive to think twice about 
risking the solvency of the business.  And, of course, limiting regulatory intervention 
to term would allow firms the leeway to choose the most efficient long-term 
incentives for their situation. 
 
 For example, the approach advocated by Judge Posner could be modified to 
require only that some fraction of pay not vest for a specified number of years, or 
                                                 
 
115 See Walker, supra note 32. 
116 Unfortunately, clawback provisions would do nothing to discourage recklessness, and so 
they do not represent a complete solution to short-termism. 




Bhagat and Romano’s approach could be modified to require only that all pay beyond 
salary (and perhaps a limited budget for perks) remain unvested until retirement plus 
two to four years.  The unvested pay could take the form of stock, an option, a long-
term accounting-based incentive, or, as suggested above, even an unsecured creditor 
interest, such as deferred compensation.   
 
 Alternatively, term-only regulation could be based on a comprehensive measure 
of the average holding period of an executive’s pay package.  Imagine, for example, a 
rule mandating a minimum four year weighted average holding period for CEO pay.  
This approach would continue to ensure that executives are bound to their firms 
economically for an extended period, but would allow firms even greater flexibility in 
designing pay packages.  The four year minimum could be achieved, for example, by 
dividing compensation equally into current salary and stock or options that do not 
vest for eight years, by deferring all compensation for four years in whatever form or 
forms the company and executive agrees to, or through some other combination. 
 
 A term-only approach would permit greater diversity in compensation design and 
mitigate some of the harshest aspects the approaches we have considered.  Allowing 
firms to bind executives to the long-term fortune of their companies through 
accounting-based incentives and even deferred cash compensation would mitigate 
valuation and diversification problems inherent in approaches limiting incentive pay 
to equity-based instruments.  A term-only approach would still have a one-size-fits-all 
aspect, but the greater flexibility for compensation design should mitigate 
inefficiencies and reduce the incentive to circumvent the regulation.   
 
 However, a term-only approach might have an adverse effect on executive 
conservatism.  As we have seen, extending holding periods for equity pay increases 
the gap between shareholder cost and executive value.  As a result, the flexibility to 
choose between instruments would tend to result in a less risky basket of instruments 
and greater executive conservatism.117  Naturally, the degree to which compensation 
risk would be reduced would depend on the length of term imposed.  Requiring 
executives to hold pay until retirement would result in a much greater shift away from 
risk than requiring that a fraction of pay be held for, say, five or six years.  
 
 Given the risk of excessive conservatism, I cannot claim that term-only 
approaches dominate instrument-specific regulation aimed at combating short-
termism.  Nonetheless, if regulation is to be undertaken, policy makers should 
consider term-only approaches as alternatives to existing instrument-specific 
proposals. 
 
B. Disclosure-Based Regulation 
 
                                                 
 
117 In addition, a term-only approach of this nature continues to focus only on the “flow” of 
incentives, not the sum total of incentives created by other equity holdings, promotional aspirations, 
etc. 
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 This essay has focused on compulsory regulation aimed at improving the link 
between executive pay and long-term company performance, and, to the extent that 
short-termism is a result of market myopia and/or externalities, it seems likely that 
some degree of coercion probably would be needed to effect change.  Enhanced 
disclosure of executive pay practices, for example, is unlikely to result in firms 
increasing holding periods if shareholders prefer the current arrangements.  
Unfortunately, highly coercive regulation carries the greatest collateral risks and 
costs.  One-size-fits-all regulation inevitably involves some over-inclusiveness, and 
firms have little choice but to comply with compulsory regulation.118 
 
 On the other hand, to the extent that short-termism is driven by managerial 
myopia and agency problems, there might be a useful role for enhanced disclosure.  
Were it not for the opacity of complex and diverse compensation arrangements, so 
this story goes, boards and shareholders would adjust compensation arrangements to 
increase the link between executive wealth and long-term company performance (or 
at least the link between executive wealth and company solvency). 
 
 The average holding period of pay discussed in the previous subsection might 
provide a reasonable basis for a disclosure-based regime.  In order to avoid the type 
of circumvention that plagued the SEC’s former piecemeal executive pay disclosure 
requirements, disclosure of the term of executive pay should be comprehensive, and 
disclosure of an average holding period that includes every element of compensation 
would be comprehensive.119   
 
 One can, in fact, imagine a range of possible disclosure metrics extending from 
simple weighted average holding period, which would serve as a measure of 
protection against bet-the-company risks, to more complex measures involving both 
the term of pay and sensitivity of pay to performance.  The potential benefits of such 
disclosure would include facilitating comparison between firms on the extent to 
which executive pay packages are focused on the long term, providing baseline data 
and context to administrators evaluating more coercive regulatory proposals, giving 
outside directors ammunition in negotiating pay packages with senior executives, and 
giving shareholders who have a “say on pay” a consistent basis for evaluating the 
term as well as the amount of executive compensation proposed by the directors.120 
                                                 
 
118 Of course, one way of ratcheting down the potential harm of such regulation is to lower the 
stakes by converting compulsory rules into tax or tax-like incentives.  Unfortunately, as we have seen, 
previous attempts at using the tax code to regulate executive pay have been less than fully successful. 
119 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  The other negative consequence of disclosure 
of executive pay amounts was an upward ratcheting in the value of pay packages, but there is no 
reason to think that the term of executive pay would be subject to a Lake Wobegon effect.  Arguably 
better executives should be paid more, but not more quickly or more slowly than their peers. 
120 “Say on pay” proposals would give shareholders an advisory, up or down vote on 
executive compensation.  As of March 2009, nineteen U.S. companies had voluntarily adopted “say on 
pay” procedures, and large numbers of shareholders have voted in support of “say on pay” at many 
other companies.  See RiskMetrics Group, Risk & Governance Blog, Mar. 12, 2009.  ARRA requires 
TARP recipients to submit executive compensation to an annual non-binding shareholder vote, see 
ARRA, supra note 3, and there is support in Congress for requiring “say on pay” more generally.  See, 




 A disclosure-based approach to combating short-termism would minimize the 
collateral damage from regulation, but disclosure alone is unlikely to have the same 
effect on compensation design and short-termism as more coercive regulation.  That’s 
the tradeoff.  Whether it is a good tradeoff depends on the extent and ultimate source 
of the short-termism problem.  Given considerable uncertainty on both counts, 
however, caution is warranted. 





 If combating earnings manipulation and reckless short-term behavior were the 
only issues, crafting a regulatory response to short-termism would be a fairly easy 
task.  It’s not difficult to bind executive wealth to long-term firm performance and 
deter managers from risking the solvency of their companies.  But shareholders and 
society care about more than solvency.  We are also interested in the efficiency of 
compensation and in encouraging executives to take appropriate risks that maximize 
the long-term prospects of our companies.  These conflicting priorities create a 
difficult balancing act, too difficult, perhaps, to be the subject of one-size-fits-all, 
coercive regulation. 
 
 So what can be done to reduce short-termism?  Despite the lack of empirical 
evidence, I share the view that executive pay probably is too short term focused, 
systemically, as a result of managerial agency problems and opacity, and thus count 
myself among those frustrated by the barriers to fruitful coercive regulation.   
 
 First, we can work to mitigate the underlying agency problems through improved 
board structure and governance practices,121 and we can directly address the other 
potential underlying causes of short-termism, such as market myopia, through 
education, market reforms, and improved reporting.122  Second, we can employ less 
coercive means of encouraging firms to increase the long-term focus of executive pay 
that will minimize unintended consequences.  Comprehensive disclosure of the term 
of executive pay might be one approach.  Another would be increased pressure on 
firms from congressional committees and proxy advisors to extend incentive holding 
periods.123  Persuasion would be more effective, of course, if backed by empirical 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
e.g., Stephen Labaton, Democrats Seek Shareholder Voting on Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 
2007, at C2 (noting House debate on a bill that would give shareholders the right to a nonbinding vote 
on golden parachutes awarded to senior executives during negotiations over the purchase or sale of a 
company).  
121 See, e.g., RiskMetrics Group, U.S. Corporate Governance Policy, 2009 Updates (Nov. 25, 
2008) (outlining board structure and governance best practices). 
122 See, e.g., Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of Short-Term Performance Obsession, 61 
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 65, 70 (2005) (proposing improved corporate performance reporting, focusing on 
accruals, as a means of reducing obsession with quarterly results).  
123 Currently, proxy advisor RiskMetrics’ statement of executive compensation best practices 
includes only vague language that five year equity vesting “do[es] not necessarily provide a long-term 
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evidence linking longer incentive holding periods with reduced executive risk taking 
and enhanced firm performance. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
focus” and that forcing executives to hold stock until retirement “can encourage a long-term focus.”  
See RiskMetrics Group, supra note 121, at 28-29. 
